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"All men by nature desire knowledge."
-- Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 1, ch. 1.

It has been the tendency of philosophers in the Twentieth Century to
examine the philosophy of Immanuel Kant in parcels, by analyzing key Kantian
concepts, arguments, and distinctions without relation to the architectonic
to v/hich they belong.

Thus, for example, large bodies of literature are

devoted exclusively to Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic
judgments, to his conception of Categories, and to his argument that existence
is not a predicate.

The elucidation and employment of isolated Kantian ideas

has greatly enhanced many contemporary philosophical theories, particulaxly
in epistemology, and manifests the enormous debt owed Kant by modern thinkers.
On this basis alone it is no exaggeration to state that Kant's influence on
the development of philosophy is as extensive as that of any philosopher
since Plato and Aristotle.

But Kant's contribution to philosophical thought

should not be restricted to the utility of his ideas distinct from the
Critical Philosophy as a whole.

Kant's systematic account of human knowledge

in the Critique of Pure Reason, brilliant if not completely satisfactory,
merits attention and criticism in it's own right.

In the Critique Kant

forges from ideas unprecedented in the history of philosophy a philosophical
edifice which purports both to establish conclusively the validity of scien
tific knowledge of the sensible world, and to refute just as conclusively
claims that reason can provide knowledge of objects beyond the bounds of
possible experience.

That Kant's success in this endeavor is not complete

is neither suprising nor detrimental to the value of his philosophical system.
What is suprising is the fresh and unique approach he brings to the problem

of human knowledge, and the nearness which that approach brings him to
solving the problem.
Kant's philosophy is best understood as an attempt to reconcile British
empiricism with Continental rationalism, Locke and Hume with Descartes and
Leibniz.

Beginning with Descartes, European philosophers became preoccupied

with questions of what knowledge is and how it is obtained.

Concurring with

the ideas of Descartes, the rationalist philosophers maintained that certain
fundamental propositions, for example, that Gk)d exists, or that the soul is
immortal, can be known a priori through the use of reason, without reference
to sense experience.

According to the rationalists, such propositions are,

or are deduced from, innate ideas or principles, and many rationalist phil
osophers constructed elaborate deductive philosophical systems a priori on
these fundamental principles.

On the other hand, the empiricist school,

whose philosophy achieved its most consistent formulation with Hume, an older
contemporary of Kant's, argued that all knowledge is derived from sense im
pressions, that the mind without experience is, in Locke's words, a "tabula
rasa," possessing no knowledge whatsoever.

Kant recognizes fundamental pro

blems with both rationalist and empiricist accounts of knowledge.

The empir

icist thesis that there is no idea without a corresponding sense impression
is, as Hume showed, tantamount to an admission that knowledge of the external
world is impossible, a position which, to Kant anyway, is not very satisfying
philosophically.

The problem with rationalism is nearly the opposite;

phil

osophers who supposed that they had a priori knowledge made such various and
often conflicting claims about the content of that knowledge that any claim
to a priori knowledge had to be met with skepticism.
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Kant is quite unprepared to accept the skeptical conclusions of Humean
empiricism as well as the extravagant claims of the rationalist school.

That

he knows many propositions about the world Kant is not inclined to doubt.
His Critical Philosophy is not constructed to prove that he knows, rather to
explain how it is possible to know what he knows.

But Kant restricts the

scope of what he knows, and of what is possible to know, to propositions
connected with experience, denying the rationalist thesis that reason alone
is capable of obtaining knowledge of objects which could not possibly be
experienced, and claiming that all arguments which purport to establish such
knowledge through the use of reason unaided by experience involve fundamental
logical fallacies.

Kant avoids the skepticism of empiricism

and the fallacies

of rationalism by claiming that a limited number of synthetic propositions
can be known a priori, but that such propositions cannot be known without
reference to experience.

These propositions are known prior to experience

because experience itself is impossible without their being time.

The fact

and nature of human experience verifies the truth of certain propositions
about the world a priori.
Kant's idea that all humans possess a priori knowledge of certain pro
positions which both refer to experience and make experience possible is a
novel one in the history of philosophy.

It is an admirable, if not completely

successful effort to distill out and combine crucial elements of both the
rationalist and empiricist traditions into a theory of knowledge which has
none of the implausible or unsatisfying consequences of those traditions.
In order to make sense of his idea, Kant presents in the Critique an elaborate
and lengthy exposition explaining how a particular perceptual and conceptual
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apparatus of the hunan mind, from which can

derived a priori knowledge,

is required for humans to have experience at all.

Humn beings, according

to Kant, do and must perceive and conf'#»-!wo +u^
n ^ a..
F
c dna conceive the world through specific nodes
which consitute the subjective form*? n-r
j uxve iorms ol experience, and without these forms
there could be no content in exoerienrp
x
i
experience, or at least no knowable content.
Kant maintains that through these forms of experience phenomena are organized
spatially and temporally by a faculty which he calls "pure intuition." and
concepts are categorized according to twelve fundamental concepts, derived
from the laws of logic, by the faculty of "pure understanding."

Following

the outline of the Critique, it is my intention in this paper to explicate
the perceptual and conceptual faculties Kant presents, show how Kant derives
^

principles from the relation of the two faculties, and finally, in

the last section of the paper, evaluate the significance of the Critical
Philosophy to modern philosophical inquiry.

Kant makes a sharp distinction between the faculty of perception and
the faculty of intellection, and this distinction serves as the basis for
the division of his account of the possibility of experience in the Gritique
into the
the

Transcendental Aesthetic" and the "Transcendental Analytic."

Aesthetic

In

Kant argues for the ideality of space and time, maintaining

that space and time do not exist in themselves, or at least not necessarily.
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Space and time are "pure intuitions," contributed by the perceiver accordi
to Kant, actively projected onto reality as the subjective forms of all
appearances.

In arguing thus, Kant supports a theory of perception dras

tically different from traditional theories which consider perception to
be the mind's passive reception of the effects of external, objects on the
senses.

For Kant, the forms of perception, space and time, are not received

but imposed, and this being the case, space and time have no existence except
in the perceptual apparatus of human beings.
To prove that space and time are subjectively imposed forms, and not
real existents, Kant presents two types of arguments, "metaphysical" and
"transcendental."

The metaphysical arguments are based on analyses of the

nature of space and time, and the transcendental arguments, vdiich are epis
temological in character, are based on the possibility of a priori mathematics
The arguments regarding space and time parallel each other and are, with
minor variations, essentially the same.

I will therefore, for the sake of

brevity, discuss only the arguments intended to prove that space is an a
priori form, and of the four metaphysical arguments regarding space, I will
discuss only the second, which seems the most convincing.

It is as follows;

Space is a necessary a priori representation,
which underlies all outer intuitions.
We can never
represent to ourselves the absence of space, though
we can quite well think it empty of objects.
It
must therefore be regarded as the condition of the
possibility of appearances, and not as a determination
dependent upon them.
It is an a priori representation
which necessarily underlies outer appeairances. ^

Kant s idea is that space must be a concept based on a priori intuition
because it cannot be abstracted from experience in the way a posteriori
concepts can.

One can abstract virtually all properties in a given perception
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and still imagine that one is perceiving, but one cannot abstract space from
any perception because to do so would make perception impossible.

Thus, Kant

argues, space is not an a priori part of experience, but an a priori con
dition for the possibility of experience.
The metaphysical arguments may establish that space and time are unique,
different from a posteriori concepts abstracted from experience in the sense
that there could be no experience except in space and time.

To show that experi

ence is possible only in space and time is the object of the metaphysical
arguments, but these arguments do not show that space and time are subjective.
To prove that space and time are pure intuitions, a priori perceptual forms
imposed on reality by the perceiver, Kant relies on transcendental arguments.
In the section of the Critique entitled "The Transcendental Exposition of
the Concept of Space," Kant argues that space must be subjective because
that is the only way to account for the necessity and strict universality
of Euclidean geometry.

Kant assumes, with Newton, that space is Euclidean,

considering that the principles and axioms of Euclidean geometry are synthetic,
and are apodeictic in their application to space.

Realizing that the necessary

truth and universal application in the field of experience of the principles
of Euclidean geometry cannot be explained by induction fiom empirical data,
Kant concludes that the apodeictic nature of the principles of geometry is
possible only if the perceiver imposes an Euclidean spatial structure onto
the world.

If, as Kant maintains, it is the nature of the perceiver to

experience phenomena in Eluclidean space, the principles of EJuclidean geo
metry are a priori and universally valid, because a non-spatial or nonEuclidean perception would be impossible.
Kant's conclusion that human beings, by nature, impose spatial and
temporal structure5onto the world has some important implications about
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the nature of the sensible world.

If space and time are but subjective

forms of perception, then what is perceived in space and time is not

in

a sense, what is really there. Kant must take a position which distinguishes
the phenomenal world, the world of appearances in space and time, from the
noumenal

world, a world vriiich is somehow responsible for the empirical con

tent of appearances, but which is fundamentally unknowable because it is not
capable of subsumption under the perceptual and conceptual apparatus of the
human mind.

The perceptual and conceptual forms through which man views

the world necessarily limit the field of possible experience, and therefore,
in Kant's view, the field of possible knowledge, to that which is in space
and time.

Since the noumenal world is outside of space and time, it can be

neither experienced nor known.
Kant may therefore be termed an idealist.

In his view, objects of

perception do not exist independently of being perceived because it is only
through perception that objects acquire spatial and temporal characteristics.
But he thinks his idealism is of a much different sort than that of any of
his predecessors.

Kant maintains that he is only a "transcendental idealist "

since he is also an empirical realist:

"We assert, then, the empirical

space (and time), as regards all possible ... experience; and
yet we also assert (their) transcendental ideality"

(72, his italics).

By

this apparently paradoxical statement Kant means to distinguish his view
from other idealisms, for example that of Berkeley, which, according to
Kant, "regards the things in space as merely imaginary entities"

(244).

For Kant space and time are not "merely imaginary," but are empirically real
because the common forms through which all humans perceive appearances make
those appearances objective.

Yet appearances are transcendentally ideal
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because they are not things in themselves -of the perceiver.

they do.not exist independently

Without the subjective forms there would be no space and

time, nor would there be appearances.

There would be only the mysterious

noumenal world.
Whether or not by positing the forms of experience and distinguishing
between phenomena and noumena Kant succeeds in making his idealism any less
imaginary than those of his predecessors is a question I will return to in
Section V, after considering the conceptual apparatus of the Critical Phil
osophy.

For now, what is important to notice is that in the "Transcendental

Aesthetic" Kant has laid the groundwork for and made considerable progress
in constructing a .theory of human experience which precludes empirical skep
ticism and shows the claims by rationalists to knowledge beyond the bounds
of possible experience to be untenable.

By idealizing space and time as

subjective forms Kant is able to deduce certain necessary and a priori pro
positions, for example the principles of Euclidean geometry, which the problem
of induction prevents empirical realists from claiming as knowledge.

At the

same time, the field of perception, restricted to appearances in space and
time, will, when combined with a conceptual scheme which is relative only
to that field, limit the scope of possible knowledge to propositions about
empirical reality and render invalid all rationalist claims to transcendent
metaphysical knowledge.

Although a distinction between the faculty of perceptual intuition and
the faculty of intellection is crucial to Kant's exposition, it is only
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through a combination of both faculties that kmowledge is possible.

According

to Kant, "Intuition and concepts constitute ... the elements of all our know
ledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way corresponding
to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge" (92).

In

the "Transcendental Aesthetic" Kant has revealed the perceptual side of his
account of human experience, but before he can explicate the relation between
the perceptual and the conceptual form which knowledge is derived, Kant must
consider in detail the nature of the conceptual apparatus involved in this
relation.

Kant is convinced that, just as there must be pure intuitions basic

to human perceptivity, there also must be "pure concepts" basic to the human
understanding which, though divorced from all empirical content, provide the
form of all experience, and without which there could be neither experience
nor knowledge.

To the discovery and elucidation of these concepts Kant

devotes the section of the Critique entitled "Analytic of Concepts."
Kant finds a "clue" to the discovery of these concepts in Aristotelian
logic, thought in Kant's time to be a conclusive and nearly complete system
of knowledge.

A concept, for Kant, is a "common representation," applicable

to a number of particulars, and through which those particuleirs are related
to each other.

Concepts are essential to judgments, the objects of logical

analysis, because making a judgment requires knowledge of a concept's applic
ability to a particular, or to another concept.

Noting that Aristotelian

logic abstracts all content from concept and particular, ascertaining the
bare forms of judgments, ie. the types of relations which "give unity" to
the undetermined components of judgments, Kant considers that an analogous
"transcendental logic" may be constructed which has "lying before it a
manifold of a priori sensibility, presented by transcendental aesthetic.
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as material for the concepts of pure understanding" (ill).

Unlike "general"

logic, which is entirely empty of content, this transcendental logic would
contain some conceptual

material,

namely the concepts of space and time

and vrtiat is entailed by them, and would be therefore of significant aid in
explaining the principles of order in the phenomenal world, though its valid
application would be necessarily limited to that world.
At the basis of his framing of the transcendental logic is Kant's con
viction that the conceptual forms of experience are somehow correlated to
or determined by the logical forms of judgments.

According to Kant, "The

same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment
also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an
intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the
pure concepts of the understanding" (112, his italics).

Kant's conviction

is curious, for it is not clear why one should suppose that formal logic
could provide a clue for a logic that will account for the conceptual
structure of the phenomenal world, but it is also convenient, because in
the transcendental logic "there arise precisely the same number of pure
concepts of the understanding which apply a priori to the objects of intui
tion in general, as ... there have been found to be logical functions in all
possible judgments" (113)*

Employing an only slightly modified Aristotelian

logic, Kant lists in the "Table of Judgments" twelve forms of judgments,
which he believes are the only forms possible, and then, in a corresponding
table, lists the twelve pure concepts of the understanding, in what he believes
to be an "exhaustive inventory" (113) of the powers of the human understanding.
Following Aristotle, Kant calls these pure concepts "Categories," and main
tains that the Categories, analogous to the subjective perceptual forms of
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space and time, constitute the modes through which man necessarily conceives
his world.^
Kant's Table of Categories is almost certainly unsatisfactory.

First,

even if he could show the validity of deriving the Categories from the
logical forms of judgments, his list of the pure concepts of the understanding
would be inadequate because since Kant's day the science of logic has pro
gressed to the recognition of many more forms of judgments than Kant was
aware of.

Indeed, some philosophers argue that the number of such forms is

indeterminant, which would entail, given Kant's belief, an indeterminant
number of categories as well.

Second, Kant's list of categories may be

criticized for being too static.

That the human conceptual apparatus may

evolve, admitting new pure concepts and discarding others, seems at least
possible, but such a possibility Kant does not allow.

But more important

than the inflexibility of the Categories, and their relation to the laws
of logic, is the crucial function the Categories play in the Critical Phil
osophy:

why their employment is necessary for human experience to be possible,

and how an understanding of them discloses the fundamental fallacies in both
rationalism and empiricism.

To an examination of these considerations I

now turn.
According to Kant, the Categories "are concepts of an object in general,
by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in
respect of one of the logical functions of judgment. " (128).

As concepts

of the highest degree of generality, the Categories not only apply to all
possible objects of perceptual intuition, but serve to organize and differ
entiate those objects as well.

The understanding is for Kant a set of rules,

the most basic of which are the Categories, by which men must conceive the
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phenomenal world, and which consequently determine the limits to what men
can possibly experience, and coordinate and order that which they do exper
ience.

That, for example, the world is organized in terms of cause and effect

is, in Kant's view, a necessary truth determined by the conceptual apparatus
of human beings, specifically by the category of causality.

Though logically

possible since no contradiction is entailed, an uncaused event is nevertheless
impossible in the experienced world because the human understanding has ordered
reality so that all events are caused.

The Categories thus determine funda

mental and necessary rules to which phenomenal objects, ie. all objects in
space and time, must conform.

In contrast to empiricists vrtio must induce

nature's ordering principles from observed phenomena, Kant is able to attribute
to such principles the necessity which he thinks they so obviously possess by
making them subjective.

To Kant, "the understanding is something more than a

power of formulating rules through the comparison of appearances; it is
itself the lawgiver of nature" (148).
In order to understand the significance of the Categories to the Critical
Philosophy, and to ultimately make sense of Kant's astounding claim that the
Categories are necessary for experience to be possible, it is important to
remember that for Kant all experience contains both perceptual and conceptual
elements.

Experience, in Kant, involves both the intuiting of raw phenomenal

data in space and time, and the ordering of that data in a way intelligible
to the human understanding through the use of concepts.

Without the con

ceptual element, experience, if it could occur at all, would be

"merely

a blind play of representations, less even than a dream" (139)*

Kant

maintains that perceptual intuition by itself presents one only with a
"manifold of intuitions," a chaotic disarray of sense data which, in order
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to be considered experience, must be organized, invested with "synthetic
unity" through the employment of concepts.

The Categories are not, of

course, the only concepts capable of synthesizing the manifold of intuitions
— there are empirical concepts, derived from experience, which perform
a similar task.

But being the most fundamental and general rules to which

all experience must conform, the Categories determine the scope of that
experience from which the less general empirical concepts are acquired, by
imparting synthetic unity on the manifold of all intuitions so that experi
ence is intelligible only through them.
A proper appreciation of the understanding's role in experience requires»
according to Kant, that the synthesis of the manifold of intuition be analyzed
into three separate, though interdependent stages.

Kant maintains that there

is "a threefold synthesis which must be found in all knowledge; namely, the
apprehension of representations as modifications of the mind in intuitions,
their reproduction in imagination, and their recognition in a concept" (I30,
his italics).

The first stage, the "synthesis of apprehension," involves

the ordering of an intuition which is "contained in a single moment" (131).
Since every intuition contains a manifold of phenomenal data, it is necessary,
according to Kant, that insofar as the intuition is to be regarded as a single
unified object, the intuition "must first be run through and held together"
(131)1 that is it must be imparted with synthetic unity by the concepts of
the understanding.
The synthesis of apprehension is, however, by itself insufficient for
the attainment of coherent experience, for such experience requires not only
that the intuition of a single moment be "held together," but also that the
intuitions of successive moments be connected tlirough concepts.
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Without

consistent connections according to conceptual rules betvreen the intuitions
of successive moments, the passage of time would present to the perceiver
an hodge-podge of separate intuitions which, though in themselves quite
coherent, would render, for example, persistence through time of even the
commonest phenomenal objects beyond the capacity of humans to experience.
Thus, according to Kant, intuitions, as well as being synthesized separately
in particular moments, are connected together by reproducing in the imagination
the intuitions of previous moments, in a process Kant calls "The Synthesis of
Reproduction in Imagination."

If one "seekfs] to draw a line in thought" (133)t

to use Kant's example, one must be capable of reproducing in imagination the
preceding parts of the line in order to achieve an image of the line as a
whole.

If, on the other hand, a person
were always to drop out of thought the preceding
representations (the first parts of the line, the
antecedent parts of the time period, or the units
in the order represented), and did not reproduce
them while advancing to those that follow, a com
plete representation would never be obtained; none
of the above-mentioned thoughts, not even the most
elementary notions of space and time, could arise
(133).

Consistency and continuity in experience are possible, in Kant's view, only
through the imagination's reproduction of prior intuitions.
It is important to stress that the synthesis of apprehension in intui
tion, the synthesis of reproduction in imagination, along with the synthesis
of recognition in a concept, are not merely empirical syntheses, that is,
they do not merely order phenomenal data received by the senses, but also
have a completely a priori employment, because these thiree stages of synthesis
provide the pure (non-empirical) intuitions of space and time with the syn
thetic unity they require to be objects of experience.

This pure and a priori

synthesis of the manifold is of the utmost consequence to the Critical Phil-
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osophy, because, as will become clear as I explicate the third stage of
the threefold synthesis, that of recognition, Kant maintains that a pure
and a priori synthesis of the manifold in pure intuition according to the
Categories is necessary in order to have consciousness of oneself as a
unitary being persisting through time — a consciousness vdiich in turn
is a prerequisite for the possibility of experience.
The final stage of Kant's threefold synthesis is the "synthesis of
recognition in a concept," a synthesis which involves a person's conscious
recognition of the other two stages.

"If we were not conscious that vdiat

we think is the same as what we thought a moment before," Kant maintains,
"all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless" (133)*
Though the manifold of intuition has been synthesized through apprehension
and reproduction, there can be no experience, in Kant's view, unless the
individual is conscious of the syntheses his mind performs.

Intuitions

need to be reproduced in imagination in order to achieve continuity in
experience, but the manifold cannot attain the unity required for experience
to be possible unless the mind is aware both of what it is, and that it is,
reproducing.

Kant imagines himself engaged in the act of counting to ilus-

trate this final stage of synthesis:

If, in counting, I forget that the units, which now
hover before me, have been added to one another in
succession, I should never know that a total is being
produced through this successive addition of unit to
unit, and so would remain Ignorant of the number.
For the concept of the number is nothing but the con
sciousness of this unity of synthesis (13^)*

The synthesis of the manifold is not complete then, until the mind is aware
of its acts of synthesis, and it is this awareness, attained only in virtue
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of the prior acts of synthesis, which constitutes, according to Kant, the
concept of the object of synthesis.
The close relation between concepts and the mind's awareness of its
own acts of synthesis is the basis for Kant's argument in the "Transcen
dental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding" that the mere
consciousness of oneself as a unitary being entails the existence and valid
application of the Categories.

According to Kant, the consciousness involved

in the synthesis of recognition entaUs a unity of the conscious self, because
the acts of synthesis recognized must emanate from the same self as the one
from which the recognition emanates.

When the recognition is a priori, as

it is in the understanding's synthesis of the manifold of pure intuition
into the concepts of space and time, the concepts employed in bringing about
the synthetic unity recognized must be a priori as well, and not derived
ftom experience, because the experience from which any a posteriori concepts
might be derived would fall within the bounds of the as yet unsynthesized
concepts of space and time.

Neither can the consciousness of self as a

unitary being in this a priori recognition depend on the empirical intro
spection by which one perceives his inner thoughts and feelings since, Kant
argues, the concept of time is a formal requirement of such introspection.
The units of consciouness essential to the synthesis of the manifold of pure
intuition is what Kant calls "transcendental apperception," and is a logical
requirement which can tell us nothing about the self a priori except that
it is single and unified.
In the Transcendental Deduction Kant attempts to show from the fact
that trancendental apperception obtains, the Categories may be derived.
Apperception, it will be remembered, is logically necessary in order for
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validity.

Nevertheless, what the Transcendental Deduction- may show is

that experience requires a unitary consciousness, that a unitary conscious
ness requires that diverse intuitions be connected together with concepts,
and that since an original or initial connection of intuitions presupposes
concepts by means of which the connection is attained, there must be cer
tain concepts basic to the human understanding which render experience
possible.
If the Deduction does in fact show that there are concepts fundamental
to the human understanding, without which experience is impossible, Kant
has done a great deal to reconcile the tenets of rationalism and empiricism
into an epistemology which retains the strengths of both schools, while
banishing some of their more disturbing consequences.

With the rationalists

Kant agrees about the legitimacy of a priori concepts, because, he maintains,
certain such concepts must be presupposed for there to be experience.

But

unlike the rationalists, Kant holds that these concepts, in constituting
the bounds of possible experience, have valid application only within those
bounds, and that any employment of these concepts to attain knowledge which
transcends the limits of i)ossible experience is spurious.

Indeed, Kant

devotes over one third of the Critique, an entire section entitled the
"Transcendental Dialectic," to showing the fallacies of applying the
Categories to objects outside of possible experience, criticizing, for
example, the traditional arguments for the existence of God as depending
on invalid applications of the Categories. For Kant, it must be stressed,
experience, and therefore knowledge, requires a perceptual as well as a
conceptual element, and any claim to knowledge which disregards either of
these two elements is little more than deception.
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According to Kant,

’•our pure concepts of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions
extend to nothing but objects of possible experience, consequently to
mere things of sense, and as soon as we leave this sphere, these concepts
retain no meaning whatsoever. ”

3

By restricting the scope of knowledge to the "mere things of sense,"
Kant manifests his affinity to the empiricist school, and his interest in
setting firm foundations for empirical investigation of the phenomenal world.
Kant realizes that for empiricism to get off the ground, to glean any know
ledge at all from the external world, certain conceptual presuppositions
must be made which cannot be proven empirically.

Without such presuppositions

the empiricist will inevitably follow Hume down the road to complete skep
ticism with regard to knowledge, and will be, in the end, unable to provide
justification for the basic principles upon which science proceeds.

Kant*s

endeavor in the Critique of Pure Reason can be seen as an attempt to show
that the a priori assumptions of science are valid ones, and this he does
by showing that without the subjective forms of pure intuition, space and
time, and without the pure concepts of the understanding, the Categories,
there could be no experience to investigate empirically. By accounting for
the possibility of experience, Kant fixes the principles whereby experience
can be known.

Kant, I think, is an empiricist who understands that empiricism

is untenable without a small dose of rationalism.
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The Categories are the forms through which humans necessarUy conceive
the world, but these forms, derived as they are from the laws of logic, are
abstractions of the highest degree of generality, void of any sensible con
tent, and completely isolated from any instances in perception to which they
apply.

In order to account for the possibility of knowledge, Kant thinks

that a connection between these pure abstractions and the phenomena of sense
must be estaolished, that the scope and nature of each category's reference
must be determined.

Knowledge, for Kant, involves the making of true judg

ments, and to make a true judgment, it will be remembered, requires that
one correctly apply a concept to a particular.

The application of an em

pirical concept to a particular phenomenal object presents little theore
tical difficulty since the rules of reference for an empirical concept are
determined by the phenomena from which the concept is abstracted.

Kant sees

a problem, however, in determining the objects to which categorical concepts
refer, because, unlike empirical concepts, the Categories are a priori and
original, not derived from a body of particulars which would serve to delin
eate the sorts of things they encompass.

Lacking the built-in reference

which empirical concepts possess, the Categories, Kant recognizes, are in
danger of having no reference at all.
In his chapter on "Schematism" Kant confronts this danger by attempting
to show how the various categories can refer to paxticular aspects of the
phenomenal world.

Acknowledging that the "pure concepts of understanding

(are) quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions" (180), Kant reasons
that for the Categories to have "significance" to the data of perception,
something must be interposed between the Categories and intuition, similar
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in some respects to both, and through which the two are connected.
"Obviously," states Kant'

there must be some third thing, which is homogeneous
on the one hand with the category, and on the other
with the appearance, and which thus makes the appli
cation of the former to the latter possible. This
mediating representation must be pure, that is, void
of all empirical content, and yet at the same time,
wile it must be in one respect intellectual, it
must in another be sensible.
Such a representation
is the transcendental schema (181, his italics).

The transcendental schema, then, provides the medium through which the pure
concepts of understanding are joined to perception, thereby giving the
categories reference and concrete meaning in the sensible world.
Kant argues that "an application of the category to appearances becomes
possible by means of the transcendental determination of time" (181), that
is, by means of a synthesis of the manifold of pure intuition into the concept
of time.

Such a determination is "homogeneous with the category" (181) through

its dependence on the category for synthetic unity, and "homogeneous with
appearance, in that time is contained in every empirical representation of
the manifold" (181).

For Kant, time, th2x>ugh its dependence on the Cate

gories for coherence as a concept, and through its necessity as a concept
for ordering the manifold of intuition, is an essential part of the schematic
link between the Categories and perception.

In providing this link, and thus

securing a reference in intuition for pure concepts, the transcendental deter
mination of time also imposes an inexorable limit on the meaningful application
of the Categories.

Granted a concrete significance by time, the Categories

can be applied meaningfully only in time, and are therefore of aid in gaining
knowledge solely in the phenomenal world, and are incapable of contributing
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to knowledge of the noumenal world, the world beyond the subjectively
imposed forms of space and time.
But there is more to a transcendental schema than the concept of time,
for although the heterogeneous offspring of understanding and intuition are
connected through it, time, in itself, does not provide the unique meaning
of individual categories.

For a schematic exhibition of the reference of

each category in its individuality, Kant calls in the faculty of imagination,
and here he is at his most obscure.

Kant maintains that the imagination

produces a single a priori "representation" for each category by "an act
concealed in the depths of the human soul" (I83).

This mysteriously gen

erated representation, the schema, defines a determinate body of possible
appearances capable of subsumption under a category.

In producing a schema

the imagination restricts the scope of a category's application, and at the
same time gives the category a distinct and useful interpretation, by pro
viding an a priori representation of the category's significance in the
phenomenal world.

But this representation the schema of a category, "can

never be brought into any image" (I83), since, though it is not as indefinite
as the category, it must, in its generality, encompass a number of appear
ances and imaiges, all of vdiich could not possibly by subsumed under a single
image.

Kant, however, not only finds the production of a schema mysterious,

but he apparently finds the very nature of a schema mysterious as well.

Only

three pages after he denies that a schema can be a specific image, he states
that "(T)he schema is, properly, only the phenomenon, or sensible concept, of
an object in agreement with the category" (186), plainly implying» contrary
to his above assertions, that the schema of a category differs according to
the particular phenomenon to which the category is applied.
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Kant is correct to recognize, in his "Schematism" chapter, a problem
in fixing a meaningful application for the Categories in the phenomenal
vrorld, for it is not easy to see how pure concepts, generated byithe^mindv
and in no way derived from or dependent on the senses, can have reference
to a determinate type of phenomena.

Kant is also correct to recognize that

such an application must be fixed for the Categories to be of any aid in
gaining knowledge of the world in the form of judgments.

But aside from

the vague notion that a schema "mediates" between category and perception»
iCant fails to solve the problem of schematism.

He fails to show how it is

possible that each category has a phenomenal reference.

Instead of worrying

ibout being "further delayed by a dry and tedious analysis" (183)» Kant
vould have done well, I think, to have dealt with the problem of schematism

jn. greater depth, and to have subjected the problem to the same insightful
jcrutiny he employs throughout most of the Critique with such remarkable
•esults.
Assuming, with Kant, that the problem of schematism has been solved,
owever, Kant has now provided all the requisite tools for making synthetic
udgments a priori.

He has explained the formal characteristics of the

henomenal world in the "Transcendental Aesthetic," demonstrated the existence
f pure a priori concepts in the Transcendental Deduction, and connected
hese concepts to the phenomenal world by showing "the sensible condition
nder which alone the pure concepts of understanding can be employed" (179)
n the "schematism."

Having fulfilled these requirements, Kant's "task now

3 to exhibit, in systematic connection, the judgments which understanding...
3tually achieves a priori" (188).

Kant thus proceeds to derive from the

Jhematized Categories nine synthetic judgments, which he calls the "princi-
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pies of pure understanding," in sections of the Gritique entitled "Axioms
of Intuitions," "Anticiiwitions of Perception," "Analogies of Experience,"
and "Postulates of Empirical Thought," These principles, idiich include,
for example, the principle of Permanence of Substance4 and the principle
of Univeral CJausation,•^ are, in their derivation from the Categories, both
"the a priori principles of possible experience," and "at the same time
universal laws of nature."^ They axe, in Kant’s view, the necessary rules,
in the form of judgments, to which all experience must conform if there is
to be experience at all. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine
in detail Kant’s derivation of the principles of pure understanding. Suffice
it to say that just as the pure concepts of understanding are required for
e3q>erience to be possible, the principles are required for knowledge of that
experience to be possible. The principles constitute the a priori judgments
which, in Kant’s view, must be presupposed in order to account for the pos
sibility of making any synthetic judgments whatsoever, since "they contain
in themselves the grounds of other judgments" (188),

Kant’s philosophy brings a unique perspective to the theory of knowledge.
Rather than asking how it is that we can know principles like, for exanple,
"all events have causes," Kant asks what would happen if we didn’t know them.
If we didn’t possess a priori concepts, Kant maintains, experience would be
impossible.

Since we have experience, Kant reasons, we must possess a priori
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concepts. Likewise, Kant axgues that if we didn't have knowledge of a priori
principles, we could have no knowledge whatsoever. But the fact that we do
have knowledge proves, in Kant's view, that we know certain principles a
priori.

Unlike empiricists who attempt to show that the tasic principles

of human knowledge, what Kant calls the principles of pure understanding,
are a posteriori inductions from perceived phenomena, and unlike rationalists
who attempt to show that the employment of pure reason can establish such
principles a priori, Kant attempts to show that the validity of the prin
ciples of pure understanding rests on the question of how knowledge is
possible, and therefore, ultimately, on the question of how experience is
possible. For Kant, the truth of a priori principles is proven neither by
eiiq)irical induction nor by logical deduction, but by the alleged fact that
without such principles knowledge would be impossible.
Thus Kant approaches the theory of knowledge from a perspective much
different than the perspectives of rationalists euid empiricists. But the
result of Kant's approach may be seen as a marriage of the two doctrines.
By positing space and time as subjective forms of intuition, instead of
objective characteristics of the external world, by establishing the human
understanding's necessary possession of a priori concepts, and by deriving
a priori principles from showing the application of a priori concepts to
the world of space and time, Kant is able to maintain with the empiricist
that "all our knowledge begins with experience” (41), and with the ration
alist that human beings can know synthetic a priori propositions.

All

knowledge, according to Kant, is relative to possible experience, that is
to phenomena in space and time, but certain a priori concepts must be recog
nized, and certain a priori principles must be known, in order to account
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for what Kant takes to be the obvious fact that we have knowledge of the
world. Looking at the theory of knowledge from a unique jxjint of view,
Kant brings about a reconciliation of the two traditional theories of know
ledge, rationalism and empiricism, which providesa.firm support to claims
to knowledge of the phenomenal world, and which undermines claims to know
ledge of objects beyond possible experience.
Kant's approach to the theory of knowledge from the standpoint of
explaining the possibility of experience and the possibility of knowledge,
and the results he derives from this approach, merits the attention of
philosophers both because of the uniqueness of his approach, and because
the results he derives are in accord with common notions of the kinds of
things that can be known, and the kinds of things that cannot be known.
In ensuring the validity of knowledge gleaned from scientific investigation
— a validity which, Kant feared, was seriously threaten! by the philosophy
of David Hume — the Critical Philosophy supports the intellectual basis
on which Western thought depends.

In questioning the validity of knowledge

which transcends experience, Kant sustains the view of those who consider,
for example, questions about the existence of God and the immortality of
the human soul beyond the realm of human knowledge, and more properly in
the realm of faith.

I hesitate to call this position of Kant's the "common-

sense notion” of the powers and limits of knowledge, because I am not sure
that sense can )be made of "commonsense notion," but I do think it safe to
say that Kant's position is in accord with the view of many people, philo
sophers and non-philosophers alike, that in general objects of experience
are objects of knowledge, and objects which could not possibly be experi
enced are not objects of knowledge.

I also think that for this reason,

and for the reason that Kant's position avoids the problem of too little
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knowledge that can be gained from a consistent application of the principles
of empiricism, and the problem of too much knowledge that can be derived
ftom the principles of rationalism, Kant's approach to the theory of know
ledge rewards serious study.
Kant's theory of knowledge would be, of course, an incrdible feat were
it without flaws, vdiich, unfortunately, it is not.

Kant, I think, no more

than Berkely whom he criticizes, can regard objects in space as more than
"imaginary entities.”

Objects in space and time, for Kant, have spatial

and temporal characterictics only when they are perceived, because only
then are the subjective forms of space and time imposed upon them.

The

unperceived object in Kant, as in Berkeley, cannot exist, or at least it
cannot maintain its status as an object, the least that can be meant by which
is a thing with spatial characteristics that persists through time.

If I

turn away from looking at my book, for example, my book, according to Kant's
principles, must cease to exist as a book, for it loses all the properties
familar to it, eg. having a soft cover, having small print, having a given
number of pages, because all those properties depend on my book having spatial
and temporal characteristics, vrfiich it ceases to have as soon as it ceases to
be perceived.

Vfhether the status of unperceived objects is a fatal flaw in

Kant's philosophy I would not venture to say.

It may well be, and it seems

impossible to determine, that objects have no status qua object when they
are not perceived.

I would say, however, that Kant's idealism cannot be

distinguished from Berkeley's idealism nearly as sharply as Kant thinks it
can.
A more serious problem for Kant than the status of unperceived objects,
however, is the crucial importance of the noumena to his system.

Space and

time and the Categories provide, according to Kant, only the forms of experi
ence.

They organize the manifold of intuition in ways intelligible to the
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human understanding, but they do not account for the presence of the manifold.
Vfhat causes the manifold of intuition, the contents of appearances as opposed
to their form, is a question which runs Kant into great difficulties.

It

is clear that, for Kant, the subjective constitution of the human mind is
not responsible for the manifold of intuition, and while, for good reason,
he avoids saying so explicitly, it is also clear that Kant thinks the con
tent of appearances is caused by noumena.^

Indeed, short of claiming that

the manifold of intuition is uncaused, Kant has little alternative than to
attribute a causal role to noumena.

If the existence of the manifold of

intuition does not arise from the human mind, then that from which the man
ifold does arise must exist independently of the forms imposed on the world
by the mind, independently of space and time and the Categories — it must,
in short, be noumenal.

But in attributing existence and causality to noumenal

objects Kant contradicts his own basic principle that the Categories are
applicable only to phenomena.

Kant is able to distinguish his idealism from

Berkeley’s dictum, "existence is perception," only insofar as he attributes
existence to the noumenal causes of appearances independently of the percep
tion of those appearances, an attribution which violates one of the most basic
principles of the Critical Philosophy by applying the category of Existence
to something outside of the phenomenal world.

That noumena exist as causal,

agents is, I think, at once crucial to Kant’s system and contradictory of
the principles of that system.
Ibe role of noumena in Kant is not limited to causing the content of
appearances , however. The existence of a noumenal world is also crucial to
Kant’s views on the problems of God, freedom, and immortality, problems which
for Kant are the most important faced by philosophy.
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It is Kant's conviction,

for example, that man is a free moral a^ent, but it is also his conviction
that human freedom and universal causation are mutually exclusive.

Since

the principle of universal causation is true in the phenomenal world, it
follows, Kant reasons, that freedom cannot exist unless there axe some human
actions which are prompted by the noumenal self, the unknowable self beyond
space and time, the self which is not constrained- by universal causation.
Similarly, Kant employs the concept of noumena -bo justify his beliefs in
God and the immortality of the soul.

Although Kant*s use of the concept

of noumena contradicts his own principles, his views on important philosophical
questions, perhaps even the theory of knowledge presented in the Critique of
Pure Reason, would be impossible without such a use.
Kant confesses that "my recollection of David Hume was the very thing
which...; first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations

0
in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction."

The skeptical

threat to his previous convictions forced Kant to reevaluate his position,
and prompted the birth of the Critical Philosophy, a philosophy that he
thought was a final and conclusive refutation of epistemological skepticism,
A refu-bation of skepticism Kant's philosophy is not, for it is no less open
to skeptical doubts than other theories of knowledge, but it is an admirable
and ingenious attempt to explain the possibility of knowledge, an attempt for
which generations of philosophers have been and will be indebted to Kant.
Kant's anxiety over the compelling arguments of Humean skepticism, and his
tenacious endeavor that his convictions could be rationally justified, led
to one of the most brilliant, if also one of the most obscure, contributions
to the history of philosophy.
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I conclude my paper with a poem by D.H. Monro which seems to capture
concisely the essence of Kant's philosophy:

When Kant, aroused from his dogmatic dozes
And conscious of the very little room
For anti-skepticism left by Hume,
Decided that the intellect discloses.
Not what's out there, as everyone supposes.
But only what it finds it can subsume
Beneath the Categories (l assume
That they're like spectacles upon our noses)
He added that this blinkered human'll
Catch still some glimpses of the Noumenal
And that God, Freedom, Immortality
Are hall-marked;

Guaranteed Reality

This simply shows what tangled webs we weave
When we are quite determined to believe.

.-30-

9

FOOTNOTES

1.

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith,
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965)# ?• 68.
All subsequent references to the Critique will be in parentheses
following the quotation.

2. Kant divides the twelve pure concepts of understanding into four
distinct types: of Quantity, of Quality, of Relation, and of
Modality. The categories of Quantity include Unity, Plurality,
and Totality? those of Quality are Reality, Negation, and Limit
ation; those of Relation are of Inherence and Subsistence, of
Causality and Dependence, and of Community; and the categories
of Modality are Possibility-Impossibility, Existence-Non-Existence,
and Necessity-Contingency.

3.

Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Lewis
White Beck, (Indianapolisl Bobbs-Merrill, 19W, P. 62.

4.

"In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in
nature is neither increased nor diminished”(Critique, P. 212).

5. ""All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection
of cause and effect" (Critique, P. 218).
6. Prolegomena, P. 53*
7. Consider, for example, this passage: "The sensibility (and its field
that of appearances) is itself limited by the inderstanding in such
a fashion that it does not have to do with things in themselves but
only with the mode which, owing to our subjective constitution, they
appear" (Critique, P. 269, my italics). One can find in Kant numerous
passages like this one, where Kant carefully avoids saying explicitly
that the noumena cause appearances, but where, in talking about the
mode in which things in themselves (ie. noumena) appear, Kant leaves
little doubt that he thinks noumena cause the manifold of intuition.
8.

Prolegomena, P. 8.

9.

Quoted from: John Lavely, "Comment on John N. Findlay, *The Central
Role of the Thing-in-itself in Kant,'" The Philosophical Forum, Vol.
13 (Fall 1981), P. 74.
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